Gendered measures, gendered models: toward an intersectional analysis of interpersonal racial discrimination

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Abstract

In this paper we draw from black and multiracial feminist theories to argue that interpersonal racial discrimination should be understood as a potentially gendered phenomenon. While there are some discriminatory practices that are directed at both black men and black women, some forms of racial discrimination affect men more than women, and some affect women more than men. Still other forms may be gender-specific. Our review of existing literature shows that most survey research has utilized measures and models of racial discrimination that fail to account for these gender differences. Drawing on the 2001–2003 National Survey of American Life (NSAL) we demonstrate the importance of gender for understanding and analysing interpersonal racial discrimination. We offer concrete ways for social researchers to centralize gender in their analyses. By doing so, we hope to advance the development of an intersectional approach to racial discrimination.

Keywords: Racial discrimination; gender; intersectionality; United States; survey data; feminism.

We know that there is such a thing as racial-sexual oppression that is neither solely racial nor solely sexual, e.g., the history of rape of black women by white men as a weapon of political repression.


[M]any of the experiences Black women face are not subsumed within the traditional boundaries of race or gender discrimination as these boundaries are currently understood . . . [T]he intersection of
racism and sexism factors into Black women’s lives in ways that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those experiences separately.

Kimberle Crenshaw (1991, p. 1244)

More than thirty years ago three members of the Combahee River Collective, Barbara Smith, Beverly Smith and Demita Frazier, wrote a ‘Black Feminist Statement’ in which they described the origins of and the continued need for black feminism. They wrote:

The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. ([1977] 1983, p. 210, italics added for emphasis)

The Collective’s description of interlocking systems of oppression provided the foundation for intersectional theories that developed over the next three decades. Works such as Moraga and Anzaldúa’s This Bridge Called My Back (1981), Lorde’s Sister/Outsider (1984), and Hill Collins’s Black Feminist Thought (2000) called attention to the ways in which race, gender, class, and sexuality worked together to produce structures of oppression and opportunity. While earlier scholarship had theorized one ‘foundational’ system of oppression (whether that be class, gender, or race), black and multiracial feminists argued that ‘oppression cannot be reduced to one fundamental type’, because systems of oppression are neither produced, nor experienced independently (Hill Collins 2000, p. 18).

Despite the increasing acceptance of ‘intersectional’ paradigms in qualitative studies of racial discrimination (e.g. St Jean and Feagin 1998; Browne and Kennelly 1999; Harvey Wingfield 2007; Timberlake and Estes 2007), quantitative research on racial discrimination remains relatively unaffected.¹ The majority of survey research continues to rely on measures and models of racial discrimination that fail to account for the unique experiences of men and women (e.g. Forman, Williams and Jackson 1997; Broman, Mavaddat and Hsu 2000; Sellers and Shelton 2003; National Research Council 2004; Roscigno 2007).

In this article we explore the implications of intersectionality for survey research on racial discrimination. Though a truly intersectional approach would incorporate multiple intersecting hierarchies, as a starting point, we focus on the intersection of race with gender.

Building on multiracial feminist theories, we offer a theoretical framework to understand interpersonal racial discrimination as a
gendered phenomenon. The intersectional framework we propose suggests that, while there are some discriminatory practices that are directed at both black men and black women, some forms of racial discrimination will affect men more than women, and some will affect women more than men. Still other forms may be gender-specific. An intersectional approach to survey research, we suggest, should utilize both measures and models of racial discrimination that account for these (and other) potential differences.

Using this intersectional framework as our guide, we review the dominant survey instruments available for assessing interpersonal racial discrimination. We find that few take gender differences into account. Following this broad review, we take a closer look at one recent survey – the National Survey of American Life – and assess the extent to which its measures reflect an intersectional understanding of racial discrimination. In our final analysis, we offer one approach for analysing existing survey data from an intersectional perspective. A truly intersectional approach to survey research on racial discrimination will require the development of new survey instruments – instruments in which differences of gender, class and sexuality are made explicit. By documenting the importance of gender for understanding and analysing racial discrimination, we believe this article represents an important first step in the development of an intersectional approach.

Background

Intersectionality and racial discrimination

One of the central claims of multiracial feminist theory is that all individuals occupy multiple social statuses, and that these statuses work together to shape the experiences of all individuals (Baca Zinn and Thornton Dill 1996). Hill Collins illustrates this point well in her discussion of controlling images – those patterned, systemic images, ‘designed’ to make systems of inequality appear to be ‘natural, normal and inevitable parts of everyday life’ (2000, p. 69). While controlling images fuel racial prejudices and justify discrimination against both black men and black women, this racial imagery is oftentimes deeply gendered. Black men must contend with stereotypes such as the lower-class, hyper-sexual ‘thug’ and the de-sexualized upper-middle-class ‘black buddy’, while black women face stereotypes of mammies, matriarchs, jezebels and welfare queens (Beauboeuf-Lafontant 2009; hooks 1992; Kelley 1995; Hill Collins 2004). Importantly for Hill Collins, controlling images are not simply racial stereotypes; they are simultaneously racialized, gendered, classed, and sexualized.
A number of recent studies lend empirical support for the idea of gendered-racial stereotypes. Timberlake and Estes (2007), for example, explored whether particular racial and ethnic stereotypes depended upon the gender of the target, and found that some racial stereotypes were indeed gender-specific. Using data from the 1992–1994 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, they found that ‘whites rated black men significantly lower than black women on the criminality stereotype’, and that black women were thought to be less self-sufficient (i.e. more dependent on social welfare) than were black men (2007, p. 417). Shih (2002) investigated racial and ethnic stereotypes held by employers in the Los Angeles area and found that their stereotypes of potential employees were similarly gendered: black women were often stereotyped as ‘single mothers or as “matriarchs”’, and black men were stereotyped as being more hostile and angry (2002, p. 111). Finally, in their research on racial identity among African American and white Americans, Dottolo and Stewart (2008) found that more than half of their respondents (twenty-three out of thirty-eight) brought up issues of racial discrimination when asked questions about their own racial identity. Nine of these respondents (four men, five women) specifically invoked issues of mistreatment or racial profiling by police, and, remarkably, each of these nine respondents invoked a man as the victim of the mistreatment. The authors conclude about their respondents, ‘their accounts of racial discrimination by the police focused on one particular form of raced classed masculinity – that associated with a public discourse that represents poor Black men as dangerous and criminal’ (2008, p. 354).

While some stereotypes of African Americans might be applied equally to black men and black women (for example, Timberlake and Estes (2007) find that stereotypes concerning intelligence are applied similarly to men and women), multiracial feminism underscores the importance of considering how particular racial and ethnic stereotypes may be gendered. An intersectional analysis of racial discrimination requires us to address the possibility of gendered racial stereotypes in our research.

A second insight offered by multiracial feminist theory concerns the ‘double jeopardy’ (Beal 1970) that black women face in a society marked by both racism and sexism. In general, previous research on racial discrimination has understood discrimination as ‘differential treatment on the basis of race that disadvantages a racial group’ or ‘treatment on the basis of inadequately justified factors other than race that disadvantages a racial group’ (National Research Council 2004, cited in Quillian 2006, p. 300). In both instances, the reference group is assumed to be whites, or racially privileged groups more generally. While this approach to racial discrimination is no doubt useful, our intersectional approach asks us to consider gender-specific reference
groups as well. In a society organized by intersecting hierarchies of race and gender, it is not possible to capture the full range of black women’s mistreatment without comparing their experiences to those of racially privileged women.2

Thornton Dill’s (1988) analysis of women’s reproductive labour in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America makes this point well. She explains that, in centuries past, white women suffered as a result of being ‘confined to reproductive labor within the domestic sphere’. However, these same women were simultaneously ‘protected through public forms of patriarchy that acknowledged and supported their family roles of wives, mothers, and daughters because they were vital instruments for building American society’ (Thornton Dill 1988, p. 415). In contrast, ‘racial-ethnic’ women, like racial-ethnic men, were ‘treated primarily as individual units of labor rather than as members of family groups’. The protections extended to white women were systematically denied to racial-ethnic women, by means of state and economic policies and a culture of racism.

Thornton Dill’s work demonstrates the importance of using gender-specific reference groups to understand discrimination against minority women. A single-oppression framework that focuses on racial inequality highlights some important aspects of racism: low wages paid to racial-ethnic women and men, abusive labour practices, and dehumanization. Thornton Dill’s intersectional analysis incorporates an additional dimension: the systematic denial of the protections and privileges associated with femininity to racial-ethnic minority women. She writes,

In the reproductive sphere ... [racial-ethnic women] were denied the opportunity to embrace the dominant ideological definition of ‘good’ wife or mother. In essence, they were faced with a double-bind situation, one that required their participation in the labor force to sustain family life but damned them as women, wives, and mothers because they did not confine their labor to home. (Thornton Dill 1988, p. 429)

However problematic they may be, our patriarchal society extends some ‘kindnesses’ to privileged women (e.g. treating women chivalrously; putting a high value on women’s parenting). When these acts of ‘benevolent sexism’ (Glick and Fiske 1996) are systematically denied to racial minority women (and sexual minority women, and working-class women), the consequences are potentially even more damaging. An intersectional analysis of racial discrimination thus requires us to consider both dimensions of black women’s mistreatment in our analyses. Doing so requires us to consider how black women are
treated relative to at least two reference groups: white people generally, and white women in particular.

In addition to considering gendered-racial stereotypes and gender-specific reference groups, multiracial feminist theory also encourages us to consider the social-spatial contexts that black men and black women move through. Feagin (1991, p. 102) has argued that ‘there is a spatial dimension to discrimination’ and that the probability of encountering racial discrimination depends in part upon the environment one is in (see also Feagin and Eckberg 1980; Roscigno 2007). Our intersectional framework takes this idea one step further, emphasizing that the particular spaces that one moves through on a day-to-day basis are largely determined by intersecting hierarchies of race, gender, class and sexuality. Though black men and black women move through a number of shared spaces, black men are more likely to move through some social spaces (e.g. the criminal justice system, the military, male-dominated occupations) than are black women, and black women are more likely to move through some other social spaces (e.g. social welfare offices, domestic settings, participation with children’s schools and healthcare) than are black men. These different contexts help shape the likelihood that an individual will encounter discrimination, as well as the specific forms that discrimination may take. Our intersectional approach suggests that, if we are to better understand men’s and women’s experiences with racial discrimination, our measures should address the varying contexts in which men and women experience discrimination.

Theories of intersectionality thus underscore the importance of gender for understanding and analysing interpersonal racial discrimination. Understanding the diverse contexts in which men and women experience discrimination, the gendered controlling images that drive racial discrimination, and the racialized gender hierarchies that shape men’s and women’s experiences, are all key to understanding and researching interpersonal racial discrimination. When we consider previous survey research on racial discrimination from an intersectional perspective, the limitations (and prevalence) of the single-oppression framework become clear.

**Intersectionality and survey research**

The overwhelming majority of quantitative research on racial discrimination fails to consider the unique ways in which black men and black women experience discrimination. Studies by Sanders-Thompson (1996), Landrine and Klonoff (1996), Forman, Williams and Jackson (1997), for example, include no discussion of how racial discrimination might be gendered and rely on seemingly ‘gender-neutral’ measures of discrimination, such as that involving employment,
housing, and the police. McNeilly et al.’s (1996) Perceived Racism Scale (PRS) involves four domains of racial discrimination (racism on the job, racism in academic settings, in public settings, and exposure to racist statements) and three dimensions of racial discrimination (time, type, and response), but of the forty-two items in their scale, only four imply that black men and black women might experience discrimination differently: ‘I have known black men who have suffered ...’; ‘[I have heard people say that] black men have an animal-like passion in bed ...’; ‘[I have heard] white males talk about not desiring black women for “serious” relationships versus those with white women’; and ‘[I have heard people say that] most blacks are on welfare because they are too lazy ...’

Utsey and Ponterotto’s (1996) Index of Race-Related Stress (IRRS) similarly includes a total of forty-six items, but of these only four hint at gender differences: ‘You have heard reports of white people/non-blacks who have committed crimes, and in an effort to cover up their deeds falsely reported that a black man was responsible for the crime’; ‘You have heard it suggested that black men have an uncontrollable desire to possess a white woman’; ‘You have observed that white kids who commit violent crimes are portrayed as “boys being boys”, while black kids who commit similar crimes are wild animals’; and ‘You notice that the media plays up those stories that cast blacks in negative ways (child abusers, rapists, muggers etc. [or as savages] Wild Man of 96th Street, Wolf pack, etc.), usually accompanied by a large picture of a black person looking angry or disturbed.’ Revealingly, all four of these items invoke specific images of black men, and not women.

Of the eighty-eight items that measure racial discrimination in the IRRS and the PRS, only eight items hint at gender differences. Moreover, only two – ‘White males talk about not desiring black women for “serious” relationships versus those with white women’ and ‘Most blacks are on welfare because they are too lazy ...’ – hint at black women’s unique experiences with racial discrimination. To our knowledge, no previous study has investigated the possibility of gender bias in our measures and models of interpersonal racial discrimination.

In what follows, we use quantitative analyses of survey data to explore further the importance of gender for understanding racial discrimination. Our analysis focuses on data from the 2001–2003 National Survey of American Life (NSAL), which includes multiple measures of ‘major-life’ and ‘everyday’ discrimination (Forman, Williams and Jackson 1997; Kessler, Mickelson and Williams 1999). We ask, ‘Do the survey items available in the NSAL reflect an intersectional understanding of racial discrimination?’ and ‘How might an intersectional framework improve our analyses of interpersonal racial discrimination?’ While previous studies have assumed that measures and models of discrimination work equally for both men
and women, our intersectional framework leads us to question this assumption.

In particular, we hypothesize that the measures of racial discrimination included in the NSAL will not prod for gendered experiences with discrimination. As in other surveys, we expect to see measures of discrimination presented as being ‘gender-neutral’. Nevertheless, we have argued that racial discrimination is frequently a gendered phenomenon, and we hypothesize that an intersectional approach to modeling racial discrimination will result in significantly improved model fit. Finally, because in our society men’s experiences are frequently understood to be gender-neutral, we hypothesize that the measures of discrimination found in the NSAL will, as a whole, explain a greater proportion of black men’s mistreatment than they will black women’s. We conclude by suggesting concrete ways in which future research might employ an intersectional approach to racial discrimination.

Data and measures

Data

Our data come from the 2001–2003 National Survey of American Life: Coping with Stress in the 21st Century (NSAL), a national project which aimed to ‘gather data about the physical, emotional, mental, structural, and economic conditions of black Americans at the beginning of the new century’ (Institute for Social Research 2009). The NSAL conducted face-to-face interviews with 3,570 African Americans aged 18 or older living in ‘urban and rural centers of the country where significant numbers of black Americans reside’. The NSAL is ideally suited to this project, as it is the only recent survey that provides a national oversample of African Americans, contains data from many geographic regions, and includes multiple measures of ‘major-life’ and ‘everyday’ discrimination. The NSAL uses many of the same measures of discrimination as are used in the 1995 Detroit Area Study (DAS), and like the DAS, the NSAL allows respondents to attribute particular instances of ‘major-life’ discrimination to a number of factors including one’s race, ethnicity, age, or gender. Our sample includes those African American respondents who provided complete data to all of the questions concerning major-life and everyday discrimination (2,068 women and 1,118 men).

Measures

In this study, we focus our analysis on the gendered nature of ‘major-life’ interpersonal discrimination. Major-life discrimination refers to
experiences in which an individual encounters restrictions in mobility as a result of discrimination. In the NSAL, major-life discrimination is assessed with nine event-specific questions: ‘For unfair reasons, have you ever not been hired for a job?’, ‘Have you ever been unfairly denied a promotion?’, ‘At any time in your life, have you ever been unfairly fired?’, ‘Have you ever been unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood because the landlord or a realtor refused to sell or rent you a house or apartment?’, ‘Have you ever moved into a neighborhood where neighbors made life difficult for you or your family?’, ‘Have you ever been unfairly discouraged by a teacher or advisor from continuing your education?’, ‘Have you ever been unfairly stopped, searched, questioned, physically threatened or abused by the police?’, ‘Have you been unfairly denied a bank loan?’ and ‘Have you ever received service from someone such as a plumber or car mechanic that was worse than what other people get?’

Respondents answered each of these questions either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. After each of the above questions, respondents were asked a follow-up question: ‘What do you think was the main reason for this experience?’ If respondents attributed their mistreatment to their ‘shade or skin color’, race or ancestry, they were coded ‘1’ for having experienced racial discrimination. Respondents were coded 0 if they (1) reported not having experienced a particular type of mistreatment, (2) attributed this mistreatment to something else (e.g. their gender, age, weight, medical condition, sexual orientation, income), or (3) were unsure of the cause of their mistreatment.

In addition to major-life discrimination, we also include a more limited analysis of ‘everyday’ discrimination. The concept of everyday discrimination is meant to reflect ‘the integration of racism into everyday situations through practices that activate underlying power relations’ (Essed 1991, p. 50). In contrast to major-life discrimination, everyday discrimination encompasses the racial discrimination that African Americans face in day-to-day life. It is assessed with ten questions: ‘In your day-to-day life how often have any of the following things happened to you? ... you are treated with less courtesy than other people’, ‘... you are treated with less respect than other people’, ‘... you receive poor service compared with other people at restaurants or stores’, ‘... people act as if they think you are not smart’, ‘... people act as if they are afraid of you’, ‘... people act as if they think you are dishonest’, ‘... people act as if they’re better than you are’, ‘... you are called names or insulted’, ‘... you are threatened or harassed’, and ‘... you are followed around in stores’. Items that tap everyday discrimination are coded into six categories, where 1 represents not having experienced a particular type of discrimination, and 6 indicates having experienced this mistreatment ‘almost every day’. Our analysis of everyday discrimination benefits from information concerning the
frequency of mistreatment, but is simultaneously limited by the lack of information concerning the perceived cause of the respondent’s mistreatment.

Before proceeding with our analysis, we note that our measures of both everyday and major-life discrimination are limited in that they rely exclusively on respondents’ perceptions of discrimination. Previous research has documented a complex relationship among perceptions of discrimination, reports of discrimination, and experiences of discrimination (Essed 1991; Feagin and Sikes 1994), and it may be that this relationship is itself influenced by gender. While these limitations do not affect our assessment of content validity in the NSAL questions concerning discrimination, they are important to keep in mind when comparing gender differences in reports of discrimination.

**Analytic strategy**

We begin our analysis of discrimination by investigating the content validity of the survey items described above, and by comparing men’s and women’s responses to these survey questions. We then use the statistical program MPlus to perform multiple group confirmatory factor analyses on the measures of major-life racial discrimination. By comparing the relationship among multiple observed variables, multiple group analysis allows us to determine whether it is reasonable to use the same measurement instrument for people in different groups (i.e. black men and black women). Most existing survey research on discrimination relies on a model of discrimination which assumes the measurement tool – an index variable, for example – is not biased with respect to gender. Our multivariate analysis begins with this assumption; the first model assumes no gender differences in the measurement tool for interpersonal racial discrimination. We then progressively free individual parameters in order to determine whether freeing the assumptions of invariance significantly improves the model fit. Finally, we compare the $R^2$ of the final model for men and women, in order to determine whether the measures of major-life discrimination used in the NSAL explain a greater proportion of black men’s mistreatment than they do black women’s.

**Results**

*Do survey items reflect an intersectional perspective?*

Table 1 displays the percentage of black men and black women who report having experienced particular forms of major-life racial discrimination. Strikingly, for each of the nine measures, the percentage...
of men who report having experienced discrimination is higher than
the corresponding percentage of women. The proportion of men who
report having been unfairly denied a promotion because of their race
or ethnicity is roughly twice the proportion of women who report
having had this experience. Even more strikingly, the proportion of
black men who report having been unfairly stopped by the police
(again because of their race) is more than three times greater than the
corresponding proportion of black women. Men (though importantly,
not women) are more likely to report this kind of racial discrimination
than they are any of the other kinds of major-life discrimination. We
conducted t-tests to assess the significance of the gender differences for
each of the variables and found that, for six of the nine measures of
‘major-life’ racial discrimination, the percentage of men who report
having experienced particular forms of discrimination is significantly
higher than the corresponding percentage of women. The \( \chi^2 \)-tests also
indicate that the distribution of responses for six of the nine items is
significantly different for men and women.

As shown in Table 2, this same pattern holds true for everyday
discrimination. Table 2 displays the mean values for men’s and
women’s experiences with ‘everyday’ discrimination, where higher
values indicate experiencing discrimination more frequently. Again,
the mean values for men are higher than the mean values for women
on each of the ten items. We conducted t-tests to determine whether
these differences were statistically significant, and found significance at
the \( \alpha = 0.05 \) level for eight of the ten items. As in Table 1, Table 2
includes \( \chi^2 \)-tests, which assess whether the distribution of responses
differs for men and women. We found significant differences at the \( \alpha = 0.05 \) level for seven of the ten items. The \( \chi^2 \)-tests suggest that, for the
majority of the items, the distribution of responses differs significantly
for men and women. The t-tests show that on none of the discrimina-
tion items included in the NSAL do women as a group score higher
than men.

Without an intersectional framework, scholars might be tempted to
conclude that black men simply experience more discrimination than
do black women. The intersectional framework we have proposed,
however, underscores the potential problem with this conclusion: none
of the indicators of racial discrimination in the NSAL specifically
invoke gender. Though a handful of items draw specifically on
stereotypes of black men (e.g. ‘People act as if they are afraid of
you’, ‘You have been unfairly stopped by the police’), none of the
measures draw specifically on the experiences of black women. In
addition, none of the questions explicitly reflect the gender-specific
contexts in which men and women experience racial discrimination.
And third, none of the measures use gender-specific reference groups
to understand discrimination against minority women. Consequently,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>t-test</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For unfair reasons, you have been fired?</td>
<td>14.67%</td>
<td>8.37%</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For unfair reasons, you have not been hired for a job?</td>
<td>19.50%</td>
<td>11.03%</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You have been unfairly denied a promotion?</td>
<td>18.25%</td>
<td>7.98%</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfairly stopped by the police?</td>
<td>37.66%</td>
<td>8.85%</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood?</td>
<td>7.16%</td>
<td>5.90%</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You have been unfairly discouraged from continuing your education?</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td>5.37%</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors made life difficult for you or your family?</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
<td>3.09%</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you been unfairly denied a bank loan?</td>
<td>7.96%</td>
<td>5.27%</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have you ever received service from someone such as a plumber or car mechanic that was worse than what other people get?</td>
<td>7.16%</td>
<td>2.47%</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1%
### Table 2. Means for everyday discrimination, NSAL (N women: 2,068; N men: 1,118). Higher values indicate more experiences with this type of discrimination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>T-test</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People act as if they’re better than you are?</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People act as if they think you are not smart?</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Been treated with less courtesy than other people?</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are treated with less respect than other people?</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You receive poor service compared with other people at restaurants or stores?</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People act as if they think you are dishonest?</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People act as if they are afraid of you?</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are called names or insulted?</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are threatened or harassed?</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are followed around in stores?</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1%
the survey items available in the NSAL appear limited in their ability
to assess gendered-racial discrimination.

**Does an intersectional framework improve model fit?**

The next portion of our analysis presents one approach to incorporating an intersectional approach in our models of interpersonal racial discrimination. Though the NSAL data are limited in their ability to assess gendered-racial discrimination, we use multiple group confirmatory factor analysis to document the importance of an intersectional approach, and to show how gender bias, in particular, might be reduced in future studies of racial discrimination.

Our model of major-life racial discrimination is a single-factor model where ‘Major-life racial discrimination’ is the latent variable, and each of the measures listed in Table 1 are observed variables. In each of these models, the factor loading and variance of the observed variable ‘At any time in your life, have you ever been unfairly fired [due to your race, skin color, or ancestry]?’ are constrained to 1 and 0 respectively, in order to index the other observed variables. The results of our first confirmatory factor analysis are presented in the left-most column (Model 1) of Table 3. Models 1 to 4 progressively free constraints of sameness (i.e. invariance) on black men and black women’s experiences with discrimination.

Several fit indices are presented for each model, including the Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the $\chi^2$ and the corresponding degrees of freedom. Both the TLI and the CFI are indices of comparative fit that evaluate ‘the fit of a user-specified solution in relation to a more restricted, nested baseline model’ (Brown 2006, p. 84). For both the TLI and CFI, values at or above 0.95 indicate good model fit. The RMSEA also evaluates model fit, but unlike the aforementioned measures, indicates a good model fit if values are below 0.05. The RMSEA ‘incorporates a penalty function for poor model parsimony’ (Brown 2006, p. 83), and so is particularly useful for comparing fit across models.

In Model 1, each of the parameters in the model (including the mean and variance of the latent variable ‘major-life discrimination’, as well as the factor loadings, variances, and thresholds of the observed variables) are constrained to be the same for the two groups in the analysis: black men and black women. Model 1 represents the most constrained model. The fit indices suggest that this first model fits the data reasonably well. The RMSEA, which represents a good model fit if below 0.05, is 0.048 for our first model. However, the large $\chi^2$ statistic and the relatively low CFI and TLI all suggest room for improvement (Bollen 1989; Brown 2006).
Table 3. Confirmatory factor analysis for major-life racial discrimination (WLS estimation): NSAL (N women: 2,068; N men: 1,118)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For unfair reasons, you have been fired?</td>
<td>1 c</td>
<td>1 c</td>
<td>1 c</td>
<td>1 c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For unfair reasons, you have not been hired for a job?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For unfair reasons, you have been unfairly denied a promotion?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| You have been unfairly stopped, searched, questioned, physically
  threatened or abused by the police?                            |         |         |         |         |
| You have been unfairly discouraged from continuing education?   |         |         |         |         |
| Unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood?             |         |         |         |         |
| Neighbors made life difficult for you or your family?           |         |         |         |         |
| Have you been unfairly denied a bank loan?                      |         |         |         |         |
| Have you ever received service from someone . . . that was worse
  than what other people get?                                    |         |         |         |         |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance of ‘major-life discrimination’</td>
<td>0.31*** (0.038)</td>
<td>0.246 (W)*** (0.032)</td>
<td>0.287 (W)*** (0.029)</td>
<td>0.297 (W)*** (0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.620 (M)*** (0.084)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.040)</td>
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<td>(0.032)</td>
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<td>(0.029)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean of ‘major-life discrimination’</td>
<td>0c (0.105)</td>
<td>0c (W) (0.052)</td>
<td>0c (W) (0.052)</td>
<td>0c (W) (0.428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.428)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>293.225</td>
<td>195.344</td>
<td>180.095</td>
<td>108.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.f.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.906</td>
<td>0.958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLI</td>
<td>0.791</td>
<td>0.877</td>
<td>0.899</td>
<td>0.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

*Constrained.

M: parameter estimates for men; W: parameter estimates for women.

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1% (two-tailed).
As we move across the models, the restrictions on invariance for black women and black men are progressively freed. In Model 2, the variance for our latent variable, major-life racial discrimination, is allowed to differ for men and women. In order to test whether, statistically speaking, it makes sense to free this parameter, we perform a $\chi^2$ difference test with Models 1 and 2. Since one degree of freedom is lost ($63 - 62 = 1$) and the $\chi^2$ is reduced by 97.881, the P-value associated with this test is statistically significant ($P < .0001$), making it ‘highly unlikely’ that the more restrictive model (i.e. Model 1) is correct (Bollen 1989, p. 292). Each of the fit indices associated with Model 2 also indicate an improved fit relative to the first model.

We follow this process of progressively freeing cross-group constraints for the next several models. Model 3 builds on Model 2 by allowing the mean of the latent variable to differ for men and women (in addition to the variance), and again, the $\chi^2$ difference test reveals an improved model fit. Next, we produced several models to test for the equality of individual factor loadings. We conducted $\chi^2$ difference tests to see whether freeing the equality constraints individually would produce an improved model fit, and found that it did in five out of eight cases. With the exception of ‘neighbors make life difficult’, ‘discouraged from education’, and ‘unfairly denied a bank loan’, all of the factor loadings of the observed variables showed significantly better model fit when allowed to vary for men and women. Our final model in this table, Model 4, combines these models by allowing the factor loadings for these five observed variables to vary for black men and women simultaneously. Comparing Model 4 with those that precede it, we again see improved model fit for all of our fit indices, and a statistically significant $\chi^2$ difference test.

The squared multiple correlation coefficient ($R^2$) for each observed variable, which indicates the proportion of its variance explained by the latent variable, major-life racial discrimination (Bollen 1989), is presented in Table 4. For six of the nine indicators of major-life racial/ethnic discrimination, the proportion of variance explained by our latent variable is higher for black men than it is for black women. In other words, our measure of discrimination explains a greater proportion of black men’s mistreatment than it does black women’s.

Taken as a whole, the multiple group confirmatory factor analysis provides statistical support for the intersectional framework we have proposed, particularly as it relates to gender differences. Despite the limitations of the survey items in terms of their ability to measure gendered-racial discrimination, our analysis suggests that gender differences are indeed important for understanding and analysing racial discrimination. Utilizing models that allow these differences to emerge may be one way for survey researchers to bring an intersectional approach to their research on racial discrimination.
Discussion and conclusion

We began this paper by reiterating multiracial feminists’ call for an intersectional understanding of interpersonal racial discrimination. Drawing from black and multiracial feminist theories, we argued that gender influenced men’s and women’s experiences with discrimination in at least three ways. First, many of the controlling images that guide discriminatory practices are themselves gendered, causing discrimination against black men and black women to take different forms. Second, because black women and black men occupy different social-spatial locations, the contexts within which black men and black women face discrimination are frequently different, and consequently the discrimination they face can take qualitatively different forms. And third, while black men may be treated differently from white men because of their race, black women are frequently treated differently from white men and white women, because of their subordinate racial and gender social statuses, making it important to use (at least) two reference groups when assessing the type of discrimination they face.

We documented the lack of an intersectional framework in existing survey research on racial discrimination, and used national survey data to examine the significance of an intersectional approach. Two main points emerge from our analyses. First, interpersonal racial discrimination does appear to be a gendered phenomenon. Our bivariate analyses revealed significant differences in men and women’s reports of everyday and major-life discrimination. In our analysis of major-life racial discrimination, we found that our model fit improved significantly when we relaxed constraints of invariance between men and women. Consistent with our hypotheses, we also found that our measure of major-life racial discrimination explained a greater proportion of black men’s mistreatment than it did black women’s.
Second, while a large and diverse body of multiracial feminist theory suggests that gender influences individuals’ experiences with racial discrimination, our analysis of content validity suggests that existing survey tools do not sufficiently address these intersecting hierarchies. Like the survey items in the IRRS and the PRS, the items included in the NSAL fail to address the possibility of gendered racial discrimination, particularly as it affects minority women.

While a growing body of qualitative literature speaks to the importance of gender for understanding racial discrimination, quantitative research has not kept pace. Scholars of racial discrimination – particularly quantitative researchers – must make intersectionality more central in our work, and doing so will require us to re-evaluate some of our most basic tools. As Baca Zinn and Thornton Dill (1996, p. 329) write, an intersectional approach challenges scholars to ‘go beyond the mere recognition and inclusion of difference to reshape the basic concepts and theories of our discipline’.

We conclude with a call for the development of survey instruments that speak to both the different contexts within which black men and black women experience discrimination, and the different kinds of discrimination black men and black women face. Is it likely that black men experience some forms of discrimination more frequently than black women? Our intersectional framework suggests that it is indeed likely. Is it also likely that there are specific types of discrimination that black women face more than black men? Again we answer, ‘Yes’, but we note that the currently available survey data are of little help in supporting (or refuting) this claim.

While the construction and assessment of potential survey questions is beyond the scope of this paper, we offer a few suggestions based on the intersectional framework and analysis presented above. First, future surveys might prod for black women’s experiences relative to those of white women (e.g. ‘People often talk about men’s chivalry towards women. Are you treated with as much chivalry as other women?’ or ‘When you express your views, do people sometimes act like you are too aggressive?’). Second, future surveys might prod for women’s experiences with discrimination within those social-spatial locations which they occupy more frequently than men. In particular, we suggest asking black women about their romantic and family experiences and (if applicable) their experiences within the social welfare system. Finally, we suggest that future surveys include items that speak to the controlling images of black women. The NSAL already hints at some of the controlling images of black men; McNeilly et al.’s (1996) and Utsey and Ponterotto’s (1996) scales invoke these images explicitly. If we are to understand black women’s experiences with discrimination to the same degree that we understand black men’s, we must include survey items that address controlling images of
black women. Many of the controlling images of black women relate
directly to women’s gender and sexuality, in particular their status as
mothers (controlling images of mammies, matriarchs, welfare queens).
Thus, we advocate including some of these gender-specific measures of
racial discrimination alongside those measures that may be more
gender-neutral.

Taken as a whole, our analyses highlight the importance of an
intersectional approach – both intersectional measures and intersec-
tional models – for analysing racial discrimination. Future studies of
discrimination should begin from the assumption that men and women
may experience racial discrimination in different ways, and in different
contexts, and consider the implications of this for designing surveys,
constructing models, and interpreting findings. Hill Collins (2000,
p. 68) writes, ‘Intersectionality captures the way in which the particular
location of black women in dominant American social relations is
unique and in some senses unassimilable into the discursive paradigms
of gender and race domination.’ Roscigno (2007, p. 123) echoes,
‘Discrimination has and does occur differently for people of different
gender, race, and social-class backgrounds, and as such, race, gender,
and class should be examined in a conjoined fashion if empirically
possible.’ Needless to say, we believe such a project is indeed possible.
We have demonstrated here one approach for bringing an intersec-
tional framework to the dominant discursive paradigm of racial
discrimination. There are undoubtedly other approaches, and we look
forward to seeing these develop in future research.

Notes

1. For exceptions see Landrine et al. (1995) and McCall (2001).
2. The same holds true for black men, though our societal tendency to view men’s
experiences as gender-neutral may make this less of a problem (Richardson 1989; Lorber
3. See US Department of Justice (2007) and Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
4. For an exception see Green’s (1995) Perceptions of Racism Scale, which was developed
to assess racism directed at African American women.
5. The NSAL was also administered to 1,621 black respondents of Caribbean descent,
who were not included in our analysis.
6. MPlus produces thresholds for dichotomous observed variables. In all models, the
threshold of each observed variable is the same for men and women, while the scale factors of
the observed variables differ across groups.
7. We did not test for gender differences for the variable ‘fired’, because it is used as an
index variable.
8. The ‘police’ variable for men is non-significant in our final model, and this variable also
has a lower $R^2$ for men, compared to women. We suspect that this is because men are much
more likely to report this kind of discrimination compared to any other type of major-life
racial discrimination. This suggests that the factor-structure itself may differ by gender,
which would also support an intersectional approach.
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